A realistic bridge towards European banking union.  Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/09, June 2013 by Véron, Nicolas.
ISSUE 2013/09
JUNE 2013 A REALISTIC BRIDGE
TOWARDS EUROPEAN
BANKING UNION
NICOLAS VÉRON
Highlights
￿ New obstacles to the European banking union have emerged over the last year,
but a successful transition remains both necessary and possible. The key next
step will be in the second half of 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) will
gain supervisory authority over most of Europe’s banking system. This needs to be
preceded by a rigorous balance sheet assessment that is likely to trigger signifi-
cant bank restructuring, for which preparation has barely started. It will be much
more significant than current discussions about a bank resolution directive and
bank recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
￿ The 2014 handover, and a subsequent change in the European treaties that will
establish the robust legal basis needed for a sustainable banking union, together
define the policy sequence as a bridge that can allow Europe to cross the choppy
waters that separate it from a steady-state banking policy framework. 
Nicolas Véron (nicolas.veron@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel and a
Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The author is
grateful to Bill Cline, Zsolt Darvas, Martin Kessler, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, John
Olcay, Francesco Papadia, Mahmood Pradhan, René Smits, Thierry Tressel, Ted
Truman, Steve Weisman and others who gracefully accepted to review an early
version of this text.
Telephone
+32 2 227 4210 
info@bruegel.org
www.bruegel.org 
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONA REALISTIC BRIDGE TOWARDS EUROPEAN
BANKING UNION
NICOLAS VÉRON, JUNE 2013
02
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
EUROPEAN LEADERS TOOK A RADICAL STEPwhen
they announced in late June 2012 the start of a
transfer of the key instruments of banking policy
to the European level, or ‘banking union’.
Inevitably, obstacles are appearing as the impli-
cations of this decision become apparent. Meas-
ured against commitments specified in December
2012, all elements of the banking union agenda
are behind schedule. Worse, there is growing
doubt about the euro-area leaders’ proclaimed
“imperative to break the vicious circle between
banks and sovereigns” – the financial feedback
and related fragmentation of the European finan-
cial space that has been observed since at least
mid-2011, also known as the ‘doom loop’.
This Policy Contribution argues that a successful
transition towards European banking union is both
necessary and possible, but requires a clearer
acknowledgment of the policy sequence than has
been apparent in most public and policy discus-
sions so far. Specifically, the importance and com-
plexity of the handover of supervisory authority
over most of Europe’s banking system to the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), expected in the second
half of 2014, appears underestimated in much of
the current debate. This handover will be preceded
by a comprehensive assessment of bank balance
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SSM handover
(2nd half of 2014)
Present
Treaty change
(date uncertain)
‘Addressing the legacy’
(first span):
balance-sheet assessment,
triage/recapitalisation/
restructuring
‘Timber-framed banking union’
(second span):
supervision by ECB;
European resources for
recapitalisations if needed
‘Building the steel frame’
(third span):
centralised insolvency, resolution
and deposit insurance regimes;
fiscal/economic/political union
Steady-state
(’steel-framed’)
banking union
Figure 1: The bridge towards European banking union
Source: Bruegel. Note: SSM = Single Supervisory mechanism.
sheets, which in turn implies the negotiation and
execution of restructuring plans for those banks
that the assessment process finds to be severely
undercapitalised. Botched assessments would be
severely detrimental to the ECB’s credibility and,
by implication, to euro-area stability. Bank restruc-
turings will inevitably be contentious and will
require careful preparation, for which no clear
framework exists at this point.
This 2014 handover is the first of two foundation
stones that will define the eventual success or
failure of the banking union project, on which the
sustainability of the euro itself crucially depends.
The second foundation stone, unlikely to be set
down in the short term, will be a change in the
European treaties that will establish the robust
legal basis needed for a sustainable banking
union and for interdependent components of
Europe’s ‘fourfold agenda’, which also includes
fiscal union, economic union, and political union.
Together, these two foundation stones suggest the
image of a bridge that would allow Europe to cross
the choppy waters that separate it from a
sustainable policy framework. 
Short-term policy efforts should focus on the first
span of the bridge, namely the combination of03
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1. The assumption is made
here that no major policy
initiatives will be needed in
the area of deposit insur-
ance, for either the first or
second span of the bridge.
This is based on the fact
that disorderly deposit
flights have not occurred in
Europe so far despite size-
able confidence shocks.
This remains an optimistic
assumption though.
‘Sound thinking about banking union needs to integrate both the long-term, steady-state policy
framework, and the transition. The German Finance Minister has expressed this by referring to a
“timber-framed banking union” that would eventually be replaced by a “steel-framed” one.’
The first span, in late 2013 and 2014, is likely to
be the shortest but carries major risks and
opportunities because the execution of the
handover will determine all later steps of the
banking union endeavour. It is the phase in which
the ‘legacy’ of past supervisory failures will be
addressed, a painful process that is further
analysed below. Policy decisions in that first
phase must establish that (1) the ECB can be an
effective supervisor, and that (2) the banking
union project can help mitigate or break the doom
loop. If one of these conditions is not met, the later
phases of the project, no matter how well
designed, are unlikely to succeed.
The second span, starting in late 2014 under the
current timeline assumptions and until treaty
change, is the ‘timber-framed banking union’ with
a single supervisory mechanism in place, and an
imperfect but workable arrangement that
combines national resolution regimes with some
form of central decision-making. By necessity, this
framework will be less than fully consistent,
because resolution regimes and deposit
guarantee systems will remain largely dependent
on diverse national arrangements, even though
supervision is supranational, and there is also a
supranational overlay for resolution decisions and
funding1.
The third span, after the treaty change, holds the
promise of resolving these tensions with a
consistent European banking policy framework. It
will mark the construction of the permanent,
‘steel-framed’ banking union. Given the extensive
nature of the changes involved, this phase can be
expected to last a number of years before the
steady-state is fully established.
This is a long-haul project that will require much
continuity of purpose. The next sections explore
it in more detail, starting from the end with the
need for treaty change, and moving backwards to
identify conditions for a potentially successful
transition.
ECB-led balance sheet assessment and
restructuring of weaker banks that is needed for a
successful handover of supervisory authority in
2014. Time is short. Given the centrality of
Germany’s domestic politics in Europe’s current
policymaking process, no major progress is likely
to be achieved before that country’s general
election on 22 September 2013. This implies that
the last three months of 2013 will be crucial to
address unresolved policy challenges, and thus
maximise the chances of restoring trust in
Europe’s banking system and fostering economic
recovery.
TWO FOUNDATION STONES: 2014 HANDOVER,
TREATY CHANGE
The complexity of the banking union agenda made
it impossible from the start to imagine that it could
be completed in a single step. The harmonisation
of Europe’s banking policy framework started well
before the crisis, and the decisions made so far
fall well short of a banking union. Sound thinking
about banking union needs to integrate both the
long-term, steady-state policy framework, and the
transition that may get Europe from here to there.
The German Finance Minister has expressed this
double concern by referring to a “timber-framed
banking union”that would eventually be replaced
by a “steel-framed”one (Schäuble, 2013).
Thus, it is useful (though obviously simplistic) to
think of the future sequence based on two key
foundation stones. The first will be laid when the
credibility and effectiveness of the transition
towards banking union is first meaningfully
tested: this will happen ahead of the 2014
handover of supervisory authority to the ECB. The
second will be laid when the steady-state
framework is decided on, which is dependent on a
treaty change. Thus the image of a bridge, in which
each of these foundation stones underpins a
separate pile. The usefulness of this imagery is
that it helps identify the different challenges of
each different phase of the project – ie, each span
of the bridge (Figure 1).2. Respectively: (1) the
Basel Accords, including
Basel III, issued by the
Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision since 1988;
(2) the Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervi-
sion, also issued by the
Basel Committee since
1997; (3) the Key Attributes
of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Insti-
tutions, first issued by the
Financial Stability Board
(FSB) in 2011; and (4) the
Core Principles for Effective
Deposit Insurance Systems,
issued jointly by the Basel
Committee and the Interna-
tional Association of Deposit
Insurers in 2008.
3. With the exception of
AML/CFT, these additional
policy areas are not stan-
dardised or coordinated at
the international level to the
same extent as the four pre-
viously listed.
4. The inclusion of common
deposit insurance in this list
was controversial in EU
policy circles until early
2013 but has been recently
endorsed by prominent
European policymakers as a
long-term prospect. See eg
Jim Brunsden and Rebecca
Christie, ‘Dijsselbloem Says
EU Needs Long-Term
Common Deposit Backstop’,
Bloomberg News, 7
May 2013.
5. Euro Area Summit State-
ment, 29 June 2012; Euro-
pean Council Conclusions,
18 October 2012, item 12;
European Council Conclu-
sions, December 14, 2012,
item 10. 
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THE BANKING UNION PROJECT SO FAR
The banking union concept stems from the tension between the EU single market in financial services, and the
continued conduct of most banking policy at national level. The EU has a unique degree of regional financial inte-
gration. But this has not been matched by corresponding adaptations of the banking policy framework, despite
partial efforts towards regulatory harmonisation and supervisory coordination. In principle, the case for bank-
ing union thus predates the crisis (eg Cihak and Decressin, 2007; Véron, 2007).
The trigger for banking union was the euro-area crisis, and especially the realisation that the lack of European
banking policy integration led to a fragmentation of the euro area’s financial space in times of instability. Policy
and financial interdependencies between individual member states and the banks headquartered in them cre-
ated a sharp correlation between their respective funding conditions, or ‘doom loop’ (eg Véron, 2011; Marzinotto
et al, 2011). Thus, identical borrowers in different euro-area countries could not have identical access to credit,
and the ECB’s single monetary policy was transmitted differently to businesses in different member states. 
In the longer term, a functioning banking union requires four pillars that correspond to the key components of
banking policy in a developed financial environment: (1) prudential regulation of banks, covering bank capital,
leverage, liquidity and risk management; (2) banking supervision; (3) bank resolution, which involves both a
decision-making process and, to the extent that orderly resolution may entail a cost, a funding mechanism;
(4) deposit insurance. The scope of each of these pillars corresponds to a growing body of international stan-
dards issued by global financial authorities hosted by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel2. 
This list should not be considered exhaustive. Other policy areas relevant to a banking union include competi-
tion policy applied to the banking sector, including state aid control in the EU; ‘conduct-of-business’ regulation
and supervision, including consumer protection and anti-money laundering/combating the financing of ter-
rorism (AML/CFT) policy; and also taxes that apply to financial services and/or institutions, or even housing
market policy, which experience suggests has significant impact on banking system stability3. However, the four
pillars listed above together represent a now widely accepted consensus view on what the indispensable com-
ponents of a banking union are (Cihak & Decressin, 2007; Fonteyne et al, 2010; Pisani-Ferry et al, 2012; Goyal
et al, 2013; Coeuré, 2013)4. 
The decision to move towards EU banking union coalesced in April and May 2012 (Véron, 2012) and led to the
landmark Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012, which starts with the motivation for breaking the doom
loop (“We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”). These words
were repeated in subsequent summit declarations in 20125. The June 2012 declaration included the commit-
ment to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with direct supervisory authority over Europe’s bank-
ing system being handed over to the ECB; and the future possibility, “when an effective SSM is established,”of
direct recapitalisation of individual banks by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM, the common fund set up
in 2012 by the 17 euro-area members). In December 2012, EU leaders agreed to complement the SSM with a
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). EU legislation establishing the SSM (SSM Regulation) was finalised with
four changes from the European Commission’s initial proposal published in September 2012: at the insistence
of Germany, most smaller banks with less than €30 billion in assets were exempted from direct supervision by
the ECB and remain under national oversight; non-euro area EU member states may join the SSM as partici-
pating member states; the European Parliament gained additional powers over appointments of the Chair and
Vice-Chair of the newly formed Supervisory Board that would coordinate bank supervision within the ECB; and
the planned handover of authority to the ECB was delayed from the initially envisaged date of 1 March 2014 to
the summer or autumn of 2014.
Simultaneously, the EU has initiated further efforts to harmonise its bank regulatory, resolution and deposit
insurance framework. This includes the adoption of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and fourth Cap-
ital Requirements Directive (CRD4); the ongoing legislative discussion on a Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD), initially proposed by the European Commission in early June 2012, only weeks before the
decision to start the shift towards banking union; and the parallel legislative discussion of a Deposit Guaran-
tee Scheme (DGS) Directive, initially proposed by the European Commission in 2010 but long stalled. It must
be noted, however, that none of these texts represents completion of the banking union agenda. CRD4 still
gives significant discretion to national supervisory authorities in some areas and further steps will be needed
to reach the stated objective of a true “single rulebook”(de Larosiere, 2009).The BRRD and DGS directive refer
to national, not European, insolvency regimes, special resolution regimes for banks, and deposit guarantee
systems, with an aim at harmonisation and convergence but not supranational integration. TREATY CHANGE WILL BE NEEDED – BUT NOT NOW
To understand why a sustainable banking union
cannot be completed within the legal framework
defined by the current European treaties – known
as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
and respectively based on the Maastricht Treaty
(1991) and the initial Rome Treaty (1957) – it is
useful to refer to the four banking union pillars as
introduced above.
1 Prudential regulation of banks is not yet har-
monised, even after the landmark adoption of
the Capital Requirements Regulation. However,
in principle full harmonisation in this area is
possible on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, which
forms the basis for Single Market legislation.
2 On supervision, Article 127(6) TFEU provides
the legal basis for the Single Supervisory
Mechanism and most legal scholars appear to
consider this basis robust. There are four
limitations associated with this article however: 
￿ It enables the Council to “confer specific
tasks upon the ECB concerning policies
relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial
institutions”, implying that some other
supervisory tasks must remain at the
national level; 
￿ It explicitly excludes “insurance undertak-
ings”from the scope of ECB supervision; 
￿ As it is part of Title VIII TFEU on Economic and
Monetary Union and specifically designates
the ECB as supervisory authority, it makes it
difficult to grant non-euro area EU countries
equal status in the governance of the
supervisory system (the SSM Regulation
attempts to square this circle but cannot
achieve it entirely); 
￿ As the ECB’s own governance is built to
address the necessities of monetary policy,
it subordinates supervision to the ECB’s
decision-making bodies as designated in the
Treaty, namely the Governing Council and
Executive Board, and to the European
System of Central Banks’ “primary objective
(...) to maintain price stability” (Article
127(1) TFEU).
None of these limitations prevents the
establishment of the SSM and its subsequent
build-up, but each of them may conceivably be
reconsidered in a future treaty revision. The
fourth limitation is of particular concern to
those who believe that there might be conflicts
between the objectives of monetary policy and
supervisory policy. There is no universal
consensus on this issue (eg Pisani-Ferry et al,
2012; Wymeersch, 2013). Many countries
have separated banking supervision from
central banks, either partly (eg Japan, US) or
nearly entirely (eg Australia, Canada, China,
Sweden, Switzerland). Other jurisdictions have
kept supervisory and monetary policy
functions under a single roof (eg Hong Kong,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore). In the United
Kingdom, separation was introduced in the late
1990s and then reversed in the early 2010s6.
3 Resolution authority, unlike supervision, is not
explicitly referred to in the treaties. Moreover,
any special resolution regime for banks is
defined as an alternative to insolvency. Thus, a
genuine European bank resolution regime,
unlike the coordination mechanism involving
national resolution regimes that is currently
envisaged in the SRM debate, would require a
matching European insolvency regime, at least
for banks if not for other companies (Veron &
Wolff, 2013). But insolvency is a national com-
petence under current treaties – unlike in the
United States, where under article 1, section 8
of the US Constitution, bankruptcy is one of a
limited list of explicitly federal competences. 
Moreover, to the extent that a resolution
authority needs to be backed by fiscal
authority to be credible, it may be argued that a
European fiscal authority is required to
establish a European resolution authority. This
link is however less direct than for the next
item, deposit insurance. 
4 Any deposit insurance system, even when pre-
funded by the banking sector, requires a
government guarantee, which may be implicit
but must be credible, to fulfill its trust-
enhancing function. Thus, a European level of
deposit insurance cannot be credibly
envisaged without a European fiscal capacity.
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6. Euro-area countries have
a special status in this
debate as their national
central banks are bound by
their membership of the
Eurosystem and thus the
scope for conflict between
supervision and monetary
policy at the national level
is limited. Most euro-area
countries do not have
supervisory authorities
separate from the national
central bank, but there are
exceptions, including BaFin
in Germany.In other words, and even leaving aside
adjustments to the SSM that may be deemed
important, a future ‘steel-framed’ banking union
will require, among other things, a European fiscal
capacity, a European insolvency regime for banks,
and a European resolution authority. None of
these is explicitly provided for in the current
treaties.
Two existing articles of the TFEU might provide a
potential implicit basis for part of this agenda, but
arguably not for all of it and certainly not without
controversy. Article 114 TFEU on the European
Internal Market may provide a basis for a
resolution authority, as it did for the creation of the
European Banking Authority (EBA) and other
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in
January 2011, and earlier for European bodies
such as the European Aviation Agency or the
European Medicines Agency. However, the Meroni
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice7
places limits on the decision-making discretion
that such agencies may enjoy, which could prove
incompatible with the autonomy required for an
effective resolution and/or deposit insurance
body. Article 352 TFEU, also known as the
‘flexibility clause’, states that “If action by the
[European] Union should prove necessary, within
the framework of the policies defined in the
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in
the Treaties, and the treaties have not provided the
necessary powers, the Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate
measures”. A literal reading of this article suggests
ample scope for the introduction of new policies
and instruments, given the breadth of the “policies
defined in the Treaties”and the “objectives set out
in the Treaties”. However, there is a widespread
reluctance among member states to interpret this
article in an extensive manner, and the European
Court of Justice has also occasionally placed
limits on what it believes is the possible use of this
flexibility clause.
7. Judgment of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice,
Meroni & Co., Industrie Met-
allurgiche S.A.S. v High
Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community,
13 June 1958.
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‘It is doubtful that the banking union agenda can be entirely delivered on with intergovernmen-
tal treaties outside of the EU framework. This is because of the need for resolution, insolvency
and fiscal policy to be subject to adequate judicial review and political scrutiny.’
Similarly, it is doubtful that the agenda described
above can be entirely delivered on with one or sev-
eral separate intergovernmental treaties outside
of the EU framework, as was the case with the
Treaty establishing the ESM (February 2012) and
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gover-
nance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the
so-called Fiscal Compact, March 2012). This is
because of the need for resolution, insolvency and
fiscal policy to be subject to adequate judicial
review and political scrutiny. The interdependen-
cies needed between these policies and the EU
institutional framework as established by the TEU
and TFEU are likely to be too pervasive to be prac-
tically handled in distinct treaties.
A separate question is if the needed treaty
changes can be achieved through the ‘simplified
revision procedures’ introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty and specified in Article 48(6) TEU. The ‘ordi-
nary revision procedure’ (Article 48(2) to (5) TEU)
requires an intergovernmental conference, and in
some cases a Convention, to make amendments
to the Treaties, and the amendments must then be
“ratified by all the Member States in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements”.
By contrast, the simplified procedures, while also
requiring unanimity of member states, only
require a decision of the Council, not a Convention
or intergovernmental conference. Such a decision
must be “approved by the Member States in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional amend-
ments,” which at least in some member states
lowers the procedural bar compared to ‘ratifica-
tion’, which might require a parliamentary vote
and/or referendum. The simplified procedures can
only apply to Part 3 of the TFEU, and the corre-
sponding changes “shall not increase the compe-
tences conferred on the [European] Union in the
Treaties”. But it is difficult to see how at least some
aspects of the above agenda could be construed
as not increasing the EU’s competences. Thus, the
simplified revision procedures of Article 48(6) TEU
could at best be used only for part but not all of
the agenda to establish a steady-state banking
union.07
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8. Declaration of the Infor-
mal Meeting of [Finance]
Ministers and [Central
Bank] Governors, Dublin, 12
April 2013, Declaration by
Member States, annexed to
Revised Note of the Council
of the European Union
8417/1/13 REV 1, 17 April
2013.
9. French-German joint dec-
laration ‘Together for a
stronger Europe of Stability
and Growth’, 29 May 2013.
10. At least 130 banks will
be directly supervised by
the ECB. They are estimated
to collectively represent
more than 80 percent of
euro-area banking assets,
and more than 55 percent
of total EU banking assets,
even assuming that no
country outside the euro
area joins the SSM.
11. Council of the European
Union Interinstitutional File
2012/0242 (CNS), 16 April
2013.
In sum, changes to the European Treaties appear
to be an inescapable step on the path towards
permanent banking union, and are likely to require
the ordinary revision procedure with all its
implications for negotiation and ratification.
Moreover this analysis is based on a narrow
determination of the changes needed. Considered
from a broader perspective, the consolidation of
authority at the European level implied by banking
union cannot be sustainable without a parallel
enhancement of the empowerment of European
citizens in European institutions through
adequate channels of representation and
accountability, or political union. In addition and
also in a long-term view, a sustainable banking
union may entail further policy integration in other
areas than banking policy defined in a narrow
sense, including housing policy and various
aspects of tax policy. The upshot, to use
categories that became widespread in the
European public policy debate in 2012, is that
banking union cannot be separated from parallel
and significant progress towards fiscal union,
economic union, and political union. This ‘fourfold
agenda’ cannot be achieved in one step, but nor
can any of its components be completed in
isolation from the others (Véron, 2012).
After much discussion, European policymakers
seem to have accepted both the inevitability of
such future treaty change, and the need to
envisage short-term steps towards banking union
(the first two spans of the bridge) before such
change can happen. In April 2013, EU member
states declared that, in addition to implementing
the conclusions of the European Council meeting
of 14 December 2012 and thus establishing a
Single Resolution Mechanism by 2014, “they are
also ready to work constructively on a proposal
for Treaty change made in accordance with
provisions of Article 48 TEU”8. Separately in May
2013, a French-German joint declaration stated
that “a Single Resolution Mechanism (...) should
be established on the basis of the current
treaties”9. These policy pronouncements are
consistent with the recognition that the Treaties
will eventually need to be changed, but also that it
is premature to set a deadline or even a tentative
timeframe for such changes, given the magnitude
of the associated political and policy challenges. 
THE 2014 HANDOVER AND PRE-HANDOVER
ASSESSMENT
Before treaty change, the key milestone for
banking union will be the handover of direct
supervisory authority over the majority of
Europe’s banking system to the ECB10. At the time
of writing, it appears likely that the SSM Regulation
will be published in either July or September
2013. Given that the Regulation “shall enter into
force on the fifth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union”(Article 28 of the final compromise text of
the SSM Regulation11) and that “the ECB shall
assume the tasks conferred on it (...) 12 months
after the entry into force of the Regulation”(Article
27(2)), the handover will be scheduled one year
later. The working assumption used here is that
the corresponding handover date will be in
September 2014.
The ECB has an option to unilaterally delay the
handover until after that date. Article 27(2) of the
final compromise text of the SSM Regulation
states that “If (...) it is shown that the ECB will not
be ready for exercising in full its tasks (...), the ECB
may adopt a decision to set a date later than the
one referred to in the first sub-paragraph to ensure
continuity during the transition from national
supervision to the SSM, and based on the avail-
ability of staff, the setting up of appropriate report-
ing procedures and arrangements with national
supervisors”. Exercising this delaying option car-
ries risks in terms of the credibility of the entire
process, but cannot be ruled out altogether. In the
rest of this analysis however, the baseline
assumption is that this delaying option will not be
exercised.
The key to understanding the importance of the
2014 handover is to note that it will mark the end
of a process (the first span of the bridge) as well as
the start of a new phase (the second span).This is
because the handover needs to be based on an
assessment of the banks over which the ECB
would assume supervisory authority, and this
assessment will carry consequences. The quality
of this assessment will be the first and crucial test
of the credibility of the ECB in its supervisory
capacity, and of the banking union endeavour
more broadly.08
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Article 27(4) of the SSM Regulation states that
“From the entry into force of the regulation [Sep-
tember 2013 in our baseline], in view of the
assumption of its tasks [...], the ECB may require
the competent authorities [national supervisors]
of the participating Member States [in the SSM]
and the persons referred to in Article 9 [individual
banks and their staff] to provide all relevant infor-
mation for the ECB to carry out a comprehensive
assessment, including a balance-sheet assess-
ment, of the credit institutions of the participating
Member State. The ECB shall carry out such an
assessment at least in relation to the credit insti-
tutions not covered by Article 5(4) [which means
that all banks subject to the ECB’s direct supervi-
sory authority will be assessed]. The credit insti-
tution and the competent authority shall supply
the information requested”. Complementing this
mandate, the European Banking Authority has
indicated that it would conduct a new round of EU-
wide stress tests with a timetable in accordance
with the ECB’s assessment, and that national
supervisors should start conducting “asset qual-
ity reviews”before the end of 201312.
The ECB’s direct access to information under
Article 27(4) of the SSM Regulation is a crucial
enabler for the pre-handover assessment to
constitute a credible process of ‘triage’ that would
divide the examined banks into three broad
categories: those which are sufficiently
capitalised; those with capital needs that can
realistically be met by arm’s-length investors; and
those which are severely undercapitalised or
insolvent, and thus require some form of public
intervention as an alternative to a court-ordered
insolvency. Such combination of publicly-led
triage, recapitalisation and restructuring has been
the key to the resolution of most systemic
banking crisis in the past (Posen and Véron,
2009). Prominent cases include Sweden in 1992-
93, Japan after 2002 (following many years of
insufficient policy action), and the US in the spring
of 2009 (the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program, more often referred to as stress tests).
The EU has attempted to proceed with triage
before, but these attempts have broadly failed,
offering a cautionary tale for the ECB. The main
precedents are the EU-wide stress tests
conducted by the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors (CEBS) in July 2010 and by its
successor entity the EBA in July 2011. Their
results were contradicted a few months following
their release by disorderly developments at some
of the tested banks, including Allied Irish Banks,
Dexia and Cyprus’s Marfin Popular Bank (later
known as Laiki Bank). This failure, which was due
to flaws in the governance of the process rather
than the performance of EBA staff (which was
generally recognised to be of high quality),
significantly and perhaps permanently impaired
the credibility of the EBA.
The strong legal basis for access to information in
the SSM Regulation resolves one problem that
seriously hampered the efforts of CEBS and EBA
in 2010 and 2011, which were dependent for key
information on national authorities which did not
necessarily have strong incentives to cooperate.
However, two main other challenges remain, one
operational and one more fundamental. Neither
will be easy to address.
The first challenge is the sheer logistical and
technical magnitude of the exercise that the ECB
will have to perform. It will require sufficient
capacity to reach an informed judgment on the
true capital needs of each banking group included
in the scope of the assessment, the number of
which is expected to be between 130 and 200
(compared to only 19 in the US Supervisory
Capital Assessment programme of 2009). The
enormity of this challenge is compounded by the
complex structures of many European banks, and
by the near-complete lack of supervisory
experience of the ECB until the creation of the SSM.
Moreover, some of the choices the ECB will need
to make in determining the assessment
methodology will inevitably be controversial, in an
echo of the debate about EU stress tests in 2010
and 2011. In particular, the valuation of banks’
sovereign debt portfolios could be debated at
length as it was in 2011, even though the
improvement in market conditions since mid-
2012 has made this issue less intractable than it
has been in the past.
One favourable circumstance here is that the ECB
will be in the process of building a permanent
institution, even as it conducts the one-off process
of pre-handover assessment. Thus, bank examin-
12. EBA press release, ‘EBA
recommends supervisors to
conduct asset quality
reviews and adjusts the
next EU-wide stress test
timeline’, 16 May 2013. In
recent public debate, “asset
quality reviews”and “bal-
ance-sheet assessment”
have been used inter-
changeably by some com-
mentators. The
understanding here is that
asset quality reviews would
be conducted by national
supervisory authorities in
preparation for, and support
of, the ECB’s balance-sheet
assessment, but the exact
semantics may change in
the forthcoming months.09
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ers from national authorities who participate in the
process, either on behalf of their national
employer or seconded to the ECB or recruited by it,
will have strong incentives to serve the ECB’s
objectives even if that involves highlighting the
past supervisory failures of the national authori-
ties. Such incentives will be markedly different
from those that ruled national authorities’ super-
visory staff during the 2010 and 2011 stress
tests, and are better aligned with the objective of
restoring trust in the European banking system.
Furthermore, the ECB will be able to also hire pri-
vate-sector companies to help it in the assess-
ment task (Draghi, 2013). But even so, this
operational challenge entails very high execution
risks. The ECB will have little time to demonstrate
that it is able to address these risks adequately.
The second, more fundamental challenge is the
likely misalignment of the incentives of the ECB
and at least some member states, which will retain
authority over resolution processes and be liable
for any public funding, in the current absence of a
robust policy framework to address the corre-
sponding tensions. The obvious linkages between
the reputation of the ECB as a supervisor and its
credibility as a monetary institution, combined
with the frustrating previous experience of the EBA
with stress tests, create powerful incentives for
the ECB to conduct the 2014 pre-handover
assessment in a rigorous manner. Those member
states that insist on the credibility of euro-area
monetary policy, a group that includes Germany,
should in principle be supportive of such rigour
and aligned with the ECB in this respect (moreover
a significant share of Germany’s banking system
will not be covered by the assessment, given the
exemption of small banks including many German
savings and cooperative banks). However, each
member state will find itself at political and finan-
cial risk if the ECB detects significant levels of
undercapitalisation in banks headquartered on its
territory, and some member states may be
inclined to dispute the assessment methodology
that will have led the ECB to such conclusions.
‘The linkages between the ECB’s reputation as a supervisor and its credibility as a monetary
institution, combined with the frustrating previous experience of the stress tests, create power-
ful incentives for the ECB to conduct the 2014 pre-handover assessment in a rigorous manner.’
Specifically, ‘problem’ banks – those found
severely undercapitalised or insolvent in the pre-
handover assessment – must be properly
handled without major financial stability
consequences, which generally rules out court-
ordered insolvency processes. These problem
banks are unlikely to find capital on an arm’s-
length basis. Because it is difficult to imagine that
large capital gaps identified during the pre-
handover assessment could remain unaddressed
for a significant period, they will thus require rapid
public intervention to restructure them. In order to
avoid potentially disruptive uncertainty, the aim
must be that restructuring plans are announced
for all problem banks together with the results of
the comprehensive assessment, in anticipation of
the actual handover of authority to the ECB. Of
course, the magnitude of this issue, and the
identification of the member states that will be
most affected, depends crucially on the number
and identity of problem banks, which by definition
are unknown at this moment. However, if the
assessment process is rigorous, this number
could end up being significant.
In sum, the pre-handover assessment is highly
likely to need to be complemented by pre-
handover restructuring of problem banks
identified in the assessment. There is essentially
no alternative: a botched assessment,
comparable to the collective failures of risk
analysis that marked the 2010 and 2011 stress
tests, would be disastrous for the credibility of the
ECB and could have wide-ranging destabilising
consequences for the European financial and
monetary system. Conversely, a well-managed
process, with an effective framework to deal with
problem banks, holds the promise of restoring
trust in the European banking sector to an extent
that has eluded policymakers since the start of
the crisis in mid-2007. Depending on the
perspective, the handover can be depicted either
as a time bomb, or as a crucial milestone on the
path to euro-area crisis resolution. If the 2014
handover is a failure, the banking union may
become a bridge to nowhere.10
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Options to address the pre-handover restructuring
of problem banks are further explored in the next
two sections, with emphasis on the financial and
governance aspects respectively. 
THE FINANCIAL EQUATION OF 2014
RESTRUCTURING: LEGACY, BAIL-IN, AND
ESCAPING THE DOOM LOOP
As previously emphasised, it is not possible to
predict at this point how many problem banks will
be identified in the ECB’s 2014 pre-handover
assessment, assuming it is rigorous, or in which
countries they will be located or how large their
capital gaps will be. If the capital gaps identified
are small, the 2014 pre-handover restructuring as
described in the previous section will be
comparatively easy to carry out. However, based
on the observation of past systemic crises and of
moderate current growth prospects in Europe,
policymakers must prepare for the possibility of
important capital gaps with an impact that may be
macroeconomically significant. The debate on
how to share the burden associated with future
restructuring has been dominated by three
concerns: assigning responsibility for past
supervisory failures, referred to as ‘legacy’ in the
European policy discussion; shifting at least part
of the cost to private claimants, often referred to
as ‘bail-in’ in contrast to past bail-outs; while
escaping the doom loop crisis-propagation
mechanism as identified since 2011, and more
generally preserving financial stability.
Addressing jointly these three concerns will
involve difficult trade-offs and political decisions. 
Legacy
In a joint communication after a meeting near
Helsinki on 25 September 2012, the three finance
ministers of Finland, Germany and the Nether-
lands declared that “principles that should be
incorporated in design of the instrument for
[future] direct recapitalisation [of banks by the
ESM] include: (...) the ESM can take direct respon-
sibility of problems that occur under the new
supervision [by the ECB within the SSM], but
legacy assets should be under the responsibility
of national authorities”. This position was intended
to restrict the scope for direct recapitalisation of
banks by the ESM, the possibility of which was
introduced in the 29 June 2012 statement that
marked the start of the banking union endeavour
and stated that “when an effective single supervi-
sory mechanism is established, involving the ECB,
for banks in the euro area the ESM could, follow-
ing a regular decision, have the possibility to
recapitalise banks directly”. The European Coun-
cil conclusions of 14 December 2012 mention in
a more open-ended manner that “an operational
framework, including the definition of legacy
assets, should be agreed as soon as possible in
the first semester 2013” for future direct bank
recapitalisations by the ESM.
The reference to ‘legacy assets’, however, gives
the misleading impression that assets that carry
risks from the past can be neatly separated from
the rest of a bank’s balance sheet on. This is
generally not the case. A major share of assets in
a typical European bank have long maturities and
thus may be considered ‘legacy’ long beyond any
specific cut-off date, and thus the separation of
legacy assets from non-legacy assets is bound to
be impractical.
The relevant distinction is not between legacy and
non-legacy assets, but rather between legacy and
non-legacy losses. The 2014 pre-handover
assessment would force banks to crystallise
losses that had not been properly acknowledged
until then, and these legacy losses would
determine the identification of the capital gap that
may result at least partly in a recapitalisation or a
restructuring by public authorities, possibly
entailing a public cost. The assumption of such
public cost at the European level, eg by the ESM,
would more effectively contribute to breaking the
doom loop, but the perception (and in at least
some cases, reality) of past supervisory failures
at the national level can be expected to make it
politically impossible. Thus, it appears
inescapable that public costs resulting from
legacy losses in the 2014 pre-handover
restructuring should be borne by the national
public purse. For European banks with a
significant level of cross-border activity, the
capital gap may be filled by an ad-hoc
combination of national contributions from
different member states, as was the case in 2008
and later with Fortis and Dexia banks.11
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The same principle, however, also applies after the
handover, to the second span of the bridge. To the
extent that the balance-sheet assessment
conducted by the ECB in 2014 is comprehensive,
losses that might materialise at a later stage (in or
after 2015) will no longer be attributable to
national legacy responsibilities. It would thus be
contentious to assign such future losses to
individual member states, including against
assets that entered a bank’s balance sheet before
2014 but were vetted during the pre-handover
assessment. We return to this aspect below in the
subsection on the doom loop.
Bail-in
During the first few years of the financial crisis
starting in mid-2007, most EU member states
appeared to see no alternatives to bailouts of
private creditors (and even in some cases of
shareholders) to resolve banking crisis situations.
This stance, which was both generous to the
private sector and onerous to the public purse,
started with the rescue of Germany’s IKB in late
July 2007, and was uniformly applied for more
than three years until late 2010, in contrast to
parallel developments in the US (Goldstein and
Véron, 2011). Gradually however, from late 2010
until late 2012, losses were more frequently
imposed on at least some creditors, under various
(and sometimes contested) legal frameworks and
far from systematically. In almost all cases until
early 2013, such ‘haircuts’ only affected junior or
subordinated creditors, while senior unsecured
ones have remained whole13. In early 2013,
losses were imposed on senior unsecured
creditors and also on uninsured depositors of Laiki
Bank and the Bank of Cyprus. Thus, the European
consensus has moved considerably over a few
years, from systematic bailouts towards a more
significant recourse to bail-ins.
Special resolution regimes for banks did not exist
in most EU member states in 2007, but have been
introduced in many of them since 2008. They are
in the process of being harmonised, and in many
cases reinforced, through the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD), initially proposed by
the European Commission in early June 2012 and
currently under discussion. It is expected that the
BRRD will enshrine a clearer hierarchy of bank
liabilities into European legislation, signaling that
the use of public funds should only be envisaged
after all (unsecured) creditors, and possibly
uninsured depositors as well, have shared some
of the restructuring burden. However, significant
discretion is also likely to remain in the hands of
national resolution authorities.
Bail-ins and special resolution regimes represent
progress for the EU but they are not a magic
formula. Even under the somewhat optimistic
assumption that the BRRD will have been adopted
and fully transposed into national legislation by
all member states at the time of the 2014 pre-
handover restructuring, the extent to which they
will enable policymakers to avoid bailing out
private-sector claims on problem banks will
depend on circumstances. Concerns about
contagion within the banking system, the
imposition of losses to systemically or politically
important creditors (such as pension funds), loss
of public trust in the financial system (which
forced the Cypriot authorities to impose capital
controls, an experience that euro-area
policymakers may be wary of repeating) or
negative shocks to the economy will all play a role,
again depending on the magnitude of the capital
gaps identified by the ECB’s assessment. It would
be entirely unrealistic to envisage bank resolution
regimes, the aim of which is to maintain trust and
to preserve financial system stability, as purely
mechanistic, rules-based processes. Also, the
BRRD in its current version envisages private-
sector-funded resolution funds at the national and
possibly European level, but such funds will take
time to build up and they therefore are unlikely to
play a major role in the 2014 pre-handover
restructuring.
Escaping the doom loop
As previously noted, the aim to “break the vicious
circle between banks and sovereigns” has been
affirmed forcefully in successive declarations of
the European Council, and is likely to be reaffirmed
in the future. One year later, the doom loop has not
been broken but several developments are bound
to affect policymakers’ thinking:
￿ Market conditions have improved and risks of
euro-area break-up have receded, making
13. Denmark was an excep-
tion, with a more rigorous
treatment of creditors and
uninsured depositors of two
problem banks in 2011,
even though its policy
framework was later modi-
fied. Cases of losses
imposed on junior creditors
included Anglo Irish Bank in
2010; Agricultural Bank of
Greece, TT Hellenic Post-
bank, and a number of
Spanish banks in 2012; and
SNS Reaal in the Nether-
lands in early 2013. 12
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contagion prospects less immediate; 
￿ The discussion about legacy, including in the
context of the German general election cycle,
has made it near-impossible to envisage direct
recapitalisations by the ESM until at least some
time after the 2014 handover, contrary to the
initial hopes of some observers, particularly in
Spain and other member states; 
￿ The divergence of credit conditions across
member states has been confirmed and
increasingly documented, not least by the ECB.
Misallocation and/or scarcity of bank credit
represent an increasingly evident drag on
Europe’s economic recovery prospects,
particularly in the periphery (eg Darvas, 2013).
Markets are forward-looking, and the doom loop is
framed by expectations about the future. Escape
is possible only if investors are convinced that
idiosyncratic sovereign liabilities associated with
national banking sectors stop once the legacy
issues are dealt with. This entails a credible
commitment that any future public cost following
the 2014 restructuring will be borne at the
European level, and that the pre-handover
restructuring will be implemented in a way that
does not discriminate between claimants on the
basis of their nationality or the nationality of the
problem bank. These conditions are not
incompatible with the principle of national
responsibility for legacy losses, but they have two
implications that may be politically contentious.
The first implication is that the parameters for bail-
in cannot be left at the discretion of national
authorities. If investors are persuaded that, say,
senior uninsured creditors of a Spanish or Italian
problem bank will suffer large haircuts during the
2014 pre-handover restructuring, but those of a
problem bank with the same capital gap will be
guaranteed by the national government in
Germany or the Netherlands, then the doom loop
will be reinforced instead of being mitigated. This
is not a theoretical concern: for example, S&P
(2013) write “we believe that governments with
sufficient capacity [emphasis added] will
continue to support senior creditors of
systemically important banks for about the next
three to five years”. One assumes this challenge
is what the German finance minister had in mind
when he called for “a mechanism to restructure or
wind up the weakest banks in an orderly,
predictable and uniform fashion throughout
Europe”(emphasis added; Schäuble, 2013). It has
not been addressed or even sufficiently debated
to date, and we return to it in the next section.
The second implication is that an unambiguous
and credible commitment must be made by the
European Council that after the 2014 handover
(either immediately, or following a pre-determined
transition phase of no more than, say, twelve
months following the handover date), European-
level funding of the cost of future bank restructur-
ings will be the default option rather than an ultima
ratio. This is implied by the insistence on dealing
comprehensively with legacy issues at the time
of the handover, and must be made explicit. The
nature of the corresponding European financial
resources may include the ESM, a European levy
on the financial sector, or a combination thereof,
the key consideration being its pooling at the Euro-
pean level that enable a dissociation from national
balance sheets and sovereign credit conditions.
Of course, the more rigorous the pre-handover
assessment, the more limited the likelihood and
extent of post-handover reliance on European
funding for restructuring, as banks would have
comparatively stronger balance sheets at the time
of the handover and would thus have, all things
equal, less need for public intervention in the
future.
The bridge metaphor helps clarify the distinction.
The direct public funding of bank restructurings, if
needed at all, would be national over the bridge’s
first span and European over the second span and
beyond. The recourse to bail-in may help reduce
such public cost, but its parameters should not
depend on nationality.
The pain and the gain
If a significant number of problem banks with large
capital gaps are identified in the ECB’s 2014 pre-
handover assessment, the corresponding
restructurings will not be painless.
First, it is possible that one or several member
states may be threatened by liquidity shortages
as a consequence of their respective shares of the
bank restructuring burden. The EU has a policy13
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framework in place to address such situations,
with ESM assistance on the basis of the already
established pattern of ESM lending to
governments. Experience suggests that it is a
difficult process, but this is a consequence of the
insistence on national responsibility for legacy
losses.
Second, widespread restructuring of problem
banks may accelerate restructuring in the non-
financial sector, as ‘pretend and extend’ credit
would stop being provided to unviable economic
agents under the pattern colloquially known as
‘zombie banks lending to zombie borrowers’. The
extent of this adjustment will depend on the
extent of problems uncovered in the balance-
sheet assessment.
On the other hand, the potential gains from a well-
managed assessment and restructuring process
are considerable. Escaping the doom loop would
decisively enhance the resilience of the European
financial system and mitigate the economic
impact of sovereign fragility. Moreover, lifting the
dark cloud of uncertainty that currently hovers
above Europe’s banking sector will enhance
confidence to an extent that has not been
achieved since 2007, and can be expected to
have a momentous positive impact on credit
provision and European growth prospects. The
precedent of the US in and after 2009, among
others, is encouraging in this respect. Restoring
trust in Europe’s banks will not be sufficient to put
Europe back on a sustainable expansion
trajectory, but it is arguably a necessary
component of any credible growth strategy.
Moreover, it might be argued that the national
public costs associated with legacy losses in
problem banks are already priced in, at least to a
significant degree: in this narrative, investors
expect countries with weak banking systems to
be burdened by their future cleaning-up; this
affects current sovereign yields, even if the
amount of future restructuring burden is a matter
of assumption. If this assumption is even partly
true, the likelihood of member states losing
access to market funding as a consequence of the
2014 pre-handover restructuring would be limited.
The lifting of current uncertainty over contingent
sovereign liabilities from problem banks might
even have a positive impact on sovereign credit
conditions.
Even so, the period preceding the 2014 handover
and the announcement of restructuring plans for
problem banks is likely to be affected by
significant market volatility, and investors’
reactions cannot be reliably predicted in advance.
It will be important for European policymakers to
put in place robust communication channels with
the investor community, and to keep as much
flexibility as possible to address unexpected
developments. This also argues in favour of a
political agreement on significant centralisation of
decision-making, as no member state will gain
from unnecessary market volatility during this
delicate transition.
THE SRM AND GOVERNANCE OF BANK
RESTRUCTURING
While the previous section addressed the
question of funding, it leaves open the equally
difficult issue of how individual decisions on bank
restructuring might be made, with possible
implications for the use of public funds, both
before and after the 2014 handover. European
leaders decided in December 2012 to
complement the BRRD with the establishment of a
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), but the
terms of this debate are still confused and
confusing.
To start with, it is not obvious whether the SRM can
be in place at the time of the 2014 pre-handover
assessment and restructuring. As previously
emphasised, the success of this first phase (the
first span of the bridge) is a precondition for any
future banking union development. It would make
little sense to focus on the SRM if it only enters
into force in 201514 and the prior restructuring
‘Widespread restructuring of problem banks may accelerate restructuring in the non-financial
sector, as “pretend and extend” credit would stop being provided to unviable economic agents
under the pattern colloquially known as “zombie banks lending to zombie borrowers”.’
14. Rebecca Christie,
‘Barnier Says EU Bank Reso-
lution Should Start January
2015’, Bloomberg First
Word, 7 June 2013. 14
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phase is botched. Moreover, the design of the
resolution mechanism in the phase that follows
the 2014 handover (the second span of the
bridge) will build on the numerous lessons that
will certainly be learnt during the experience of the
pre-handover assessment and restructuring
phase.
Furthermore, there is no clarity yet on the form the
SRM might take, and a range of options could be
considered (see Véron & Wolff, 2013). The joint
French-German declaration of 29 May 2013 refers
to a “single resolution board involving national
resolution authorities and allowing quick,
effective and coherent decision-making at the
central level,”thus implying a collective, possibly
protracted decision-making process. By contrast,
an early draft of the proposal from the European
Commission has been reported as giving a
prominent role to the Commission itself15. This
proposal has not been published by the
Commission at the time of writing.
Even after publication of the Commission’s pro-
posal, and given the German general election
cycle, the political choices on the steering of the
2014 pre-handover restructuring and the SRM are
unlikely to be made by European leaders before
the last quarter of 2013 at the earliest. The leg-
islative timeline to establish the SRM before the
2014 pre-handover restructuring appears exceed-
ingly tight, given that the term of the current Euro-
pean Parliament ends in the spring of 2014.
There are a number of requirements on the
decision-making system that needs to be in place
to manage the 2014 pre-handover restructuring,
whether or not it is called a single resolution
mechanism:16
￿ It must allow for rapid decisions and flexibility,
while limiting legal uncertainty to the greatest
extent possible. Restructuring plans will need
to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis and
may involve complex, tailor-made financial
engineering. These require considerable skills,
flexibility, and financial acumen. Each case is
specific, and any mistake, misjudgment or
unnecessary delay can be extremely costly. A
consensus-based committee decision frame-
work is not well suited for this task.
￿ It must ensure uniformity of bail-in parameters
across member states, as analysed in the pre-
vious section. A divergence of practices would
exacerbate the doom loop and may impair
European financial stability. 
￿ It must be able to manage the cases of problem
banks with significant cross-border operations
throughout the geographical perimeter of the
SSM. An abundant literature establishes that for
such banks, the restructuring process is bound
to be significantly more effective and less
costly to the public if the decision-making
process is centralised (eg Véron, 2007), and
this is reinforced by the crisis experience with
cases such as Fortis and Dexia. 
￿ It must ensure a Europe-wide level playing field
for banking consolidation. Mergers and acqui-
sitions are a normal component of bank
restructuring strategies and can be expected to
play an important role in the pre-handover
restructuring phase. However, national author-
ities have had until now an inherent tendency
to favour intra-country consolidation for a
number of reasons that include information
asymmetries, economic nationalism and a
widespread legacy in Europe of past use of
banks by governments as instruments of
national economic policies. In a European con-
text in which many national banking markets
are highly concentrated among a few large
domestic banks, this may lead to economically
suboptimal patterns of consolidation that may
also in some cases reinforce the doom loop
rather than mitigating it.
It will be a challenge to fulfil all these conditions,
given political constraints and the absence of a
legally robust European resolution regime, which
probably requires treaty change as discussed
above, and in any event will not be in place in
2014 or even 2015. It will be even more difficult
in the absence of a European financial facility for
bank recapitalisation that could have created
incentives for member states to cooperate. More-
over, even national resolution regimes, to the
extent that they will be in place following adoption
of the BRRD, will be untested in most member
states and raise major operational and legal
issues.
A key factor is the control of state aid by the
15. Alex Barker, James
Fontanella-Khan and Peter
Spiegel, ‘EU banks blueprint
sets up clash with Ger-
many’, Financial Times, 4
June 2013.
16. ECB President Mario
Draghi noted at a news con-
ference on 6 June 2013:
“We are confident that the
single resolution mecha-
nism will be in place by the
time the single supervisor
takes over (...) A different
thing would be the exis-
tence of a single resolution
authority.”Gabriele Stein-
hauser, ‘A Single Resolution
“Nothaurity”’, Wall Street
Journal, 7 June 2013.15
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European Commission in the context of such
restructuring. Through state aid control, the
Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition
Policy (DG COMP) has become a prominent player
in determining bank restructuring strategies
throughout the EU, and has developed a unique
operational capability in this area. The continued
need to ensure consistency of competition policy
enforcement suggests that DG COMP’s financial
crisis task force will play an important and
possibly central role in any European framework
for the restructuring of problem banks in the 2014
transition. DG COMP’s competition policy mandate
makes it an awkward agent for system-wide bank
restructuring, but it may have to assume
leadership – as it has already done to a significant
extent in the case of Spain – only because it has
more of the required experience than any other
player, and for lack of a better alternative.
Even assuming that the experience and authority
of DG COMP is leveraged to the maximum possible
extent, there is probably no perfectly elegant way
to resolve this challenge. Still, Europe’s leaders
have a window of opportunity to agree on a joint
and/or delegated decision-making process that
ensures sufficiently swift and uniform handling of
the 2014 restructuring in a manner that preserves
financial stability, mitigates the doom loop, and
minimises the public cost. But, at the time of
writing, it is not possible to say with confidence
that this opportunity will be taken advantage of.
A POSSIBLE SEQUENCE
Bringing together all the pieces, we present here a
possible sequence of events that illustrates the
possibility, at least in principle, of a successful
transition towards a banking union.
This of course is not intended to be a forecast: the
current European circumstances are far too
complex for such predictability. The aim is only to
demonstrate that, assuming a sufficient degree of
lucidity and diligence in the policy process, the
numerous constraints that apply to the European
‘Europe’s leaders have a window of opportunity to agree on a joint and/or delegated decision-
making process that ensures swift and uniform handling of the 2014 restructuring in a manner
that preserves financial stability, mitigates the doom loop, and minimises the public cost.’
banking debate can be simultaneously addressed
in a reasonable manner. Market and political risks
will remain high at each step of the process, but
the banking union equation is not (yet)
impossible to resolve.
First span of the bridge: addressing the legacy
(2013-14)
￿ Q3 2013: publication of the final SSM Regula-
tion; start of operational buildup of the ECB’s
own supervisory capability; decisions by non-
euro EU member states to join or not the SSM
from the outset; progress towards finalisation
of the BRRD. 
￿ Q4 2013: adoption of the BRRD and of the DGS
directive; preliminary asset quality reviews by
national authorities in anticipation of the 2014
handover; clarification of the European deci-
sion-making system for bank restructuring in
the pre-handover phase; negotiation of the
agreement between the ECB and national
supervisors on the conduct of the 2014 pre-
handover assessment and future modalities of
cooperation. 
￿ Q1 2014: start of transposition of the BRRD into
national legislation of member states;
finalisation of the European decision-making
system for pre-handover bank restructuring;
start of the pre-handover balance sheet
assessments by the ECB with the cooperation
of national supervisors. 
￿ Q2 2014: completion of transposition of the
BRRD in individual member states; completion
of pre-handover balance sheet assessments
and corresponding stress tests coordinated by
EBA; start of preparation of restructuring plans
for problem banks. 
￿ Q3/Q4 2014: decisions on restructuring plans
for problem banks; announcement of the
results of the assessments and stress tests,
and communication on the restructuring plans;
market-driven recapitalisation of those banks
found to be undercapitalised but not severely
so; implementation of the restructuring plans
for problem banks, with funding from member16
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states to the extent needed and bail-in to the
extent possible; if any member states experi-
ence liquidity shortages as a consequence,
negotiation of ESM assistance to those member
states; effective handover of direct supervisory
authority to the ECB. 
Second span of the bridge: the ‘timber-framed
banking union’ (starting late 2014/early 2015)
￿ Further buildup of the ECB’s supervisory capa-
bilities; adjustment of European bank resolu-
tion mechanisms on the basis of lessons learnt
during the handover; any new public expendi-
ture in newly emerging banking situations cov-
ered by European resources (including the ESM
and/or contributions from the European finan-
cial sector); further harmonisation of EU bank-
ing regulation; preparation and negotiation of
treaty change. 
Third span of the bridge: building the ‘steel-
framed banking union’ (following treaty change)
￿ Implementation of treaty change and transition
towards permanent banking union: adjust-
ments to the SSM, including possibly more
autonomy from monetary policy and equal gov-
ernance rights and responsibilities for non-euro
EU member states; creation of a European
insolvency regime for banks; establishment of
a European special resolution regime for banks
and of the European Resolution Authority to
administer it; creation of a European deposit
insurance system with adequate funding and
European fiscal backstop; broader EU reform
(fiscal union, economic union, political union)
to ensure the sustainability of the broader insti-
tutional and policy framework.
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